Numerous methods for information security risk assessment (ISRA) are available, yet there is little guidance on how to choose one. Through a comprehensive risk identifi cation, estimation, and evaluation framework, the author evaluates the practical application of three ISRA methods in terms of tasks required, user experience, and results.
evaluates the practical application of three ISRA methods in terms of tasks required, user experience, and results. I nformation security should be the lifeblood of any organization. It guards against the risk of applying technology by securing the business against threats and making certain that daily operations retain condentiality, integrity, availability, and nonrepudiation. Best information security practice depends critically on well-functioning information security risk management (ISRM) processes, which continuously identify, review, treat, and monitor risks with the aim of making systems more robust against risk. An ISRM process de nes the risk event, estimates its consequences to the organization (such as nancial loss), and determines the probability that the identi ed event will occur. Additionally, a human decision maker assesses ISRA results and, if they are unacceptable, takes steps to further mitigate risk.
Integral to ISRM is information security risk assessment (ISRA), which consists of risk analysis-the systematic use of data to identify sources and estimate risk-and risk evaluation-the process of comparing the estimated risk against given risk criteria to determine its signi cance. Although many ISRA methods exist, − there is no universally accepted method for choosing among them and evaluating a priori how the choice of a method will a ect results-both of which are necessary for an organization to make informed decisions about whether to increase security levels and to maximize its return on security investments.
To address the need for comparative studies, I and my colleagues at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU−Gjøvik) developed the Core Uni ed Risk Framework (CURF) on the basis of ISRA methods and used the framework to compare them according to their tasks, application, and results. We then applied CURF in case studies for three of those methods: › Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation Allegro (OCTAVE A)-a lightweight version of the original OCTAVE method that was designed as a checklist approach to streamline risk assessment and reduce the need for further analysis by information security experts;
Information Security Risk Management (ISO )-a sequential method that comes with an extensive appendix to support users in scoping the assessment in terms of assets, threats, and vulnerabilities and is widely regarded as ISRM best practice; and › the Norwegian National Security Authority's (NSM's) Guidelines in Risk and Vulnerability Assessments (NSM-ROS)-a sequential probabilistic approach created to comply with the Norwegian Security Act and centered on asset protection, threats, and vulnerabilities.
As a rst step, we compared the methods' content-the tasks that organizations must complete-using CURF to score each method's completeness in addressing aspects of risk identi cation, estimation, and evaluation. We then analyzed data from case studies and assessments performed with the three methods from to as part of an ISRM course project at NTNU. As a nal step, we collected and analyzed experiential data from project teams and applied CURF to compare results. The study-which is the rst that we know of to compare the results of practical ISRA method application-shows the e ectiveness of CURF as a comparative analysis tool and provides new insights into method performance.
METHOD COMPLETENESS EVALUATION
Existing frameworks can compare ISRM and risk assessment methods only against predetermined criteria, , which is restrictive because the framework will overlook any tasks or parameters that the criteria do not cover. In these frameworks, evaluation proceeds from the criteria at the top to methods at the bottom, which makes it di cult to determine cause−e ect relationships between method and results. CURF's bottom-up approach solves this problem by providing a way to review each ISRA method, structure its tasks within ISO 's risk management process, and use the complete task set as comparison criteria.
For each method, CURF users identify which tasks the approach covers and then combine all the tasks covered by all the surveyed methods into a combined set. For example, one method might identify stakeholders but another does not, so "stakeholder identi cation" becomes a task under the risk identi cation group. Thus, evaluation consists of investigating the extent to which a particular method covers all the tasks in the task group. This bottom-up comparison is far more comprehensive because criteria are taken from method tasks.
As Table shows By summing the individual scores vertically, CURF users obtain the methods' total completeness score. By summing them horizontally, users obtain a total score for a particular risk assessment aspect for all the methods being compared. The latter score is useful for determining which areas an organization can expect all methods to perform well.
In the content analysis with CURF, ISO scored the highest on ISRA completion, with OCTAVE A next and then NSMROS. ISO 's score was the highest because it is a comprehensive method that represents industry best practice. OCTAVE A was recommended for inclusion in our study by risk assessment experts, who viewed it as an established method with several academic citations and references. The method considers impact areas, which are subjective estimates of risk consequences-slightly different from probability estimates. NSMROS's score was also expected. We initially applied NSMROS because our case-study project teams were Norwegian and the method had good standing in the Norwegian ISRA community. However, as Table 1 shows, it has few tasks outside asset protection and threat and vulnerability assessment.
CASE STUDIES
Using the risk assessment and treatment defined in the ISO 27000 standards 1,3 as our data scope, for each method we looked at the results from 4 risk assessments per method for a total of 12 assessments. As part of our case-study evaluation, we collected and compared the experience data from the case-study groups using postproject interviews and questionnaires.
We then applied CURF to analyze the resulting risk assessment report and to establish a cause−effect relationship between the method and the results of using it. The case studies were risk assessments of real-world targets using OCTAVE A, ISO27005, and NSMROS, which NTNU students conducted as part of an undergraduate ISRM course project (A-IMT1132). NTNU's Information Technology Services Department provided both the project assignments and resources. A team of 6 to 10 students performed each case study, all of whom had basic training in information security but no experience following formal ISRA methods. We gave all groups 6 weeks of basic ISRA training before the project, and provided project supervision through an associate professor, a doctoral researcher, and a student assistant. The students could also consult NTNU's chief information security advisor, who is an ISRA expert.
Each project team applied only one of the three ISRA methods. In addition to the method's primary documents (which outlined process steps) and the document appendices (which elaborated on those steps or provided tools such as worksheets), the teams had access to supplemental literature in a shared repository along with open sources. At the end of the project, each team presented their findings in a formal report to various system and process stakeholders, including the head of NTNU's IT Services Department and its chief security office. The report gave identified risks, an analysis of those risks, and proposed treatments.
METHOD APPLICATION ANALYSIS
We designed a survey to collect qualitative data on the users' experience applying each method, focusing on satisfaction with the method, its usefulness in terms of advantages and disadvantages, and the extent to which the project team had to rely on supporting literature to apply it.
Survey construction
The survey contained category, ranking, open-ended, and continuous question types, with most questions designed to be open-ended and ranking. The ranking questions used the Likert scale (1 to 5, with 1 being not at all and 5 being very high). For NSM-ROS and ISO27005, data was collected through an online questionnaire; for OCTAVE A, data collection was through face-to-face interviews with 8 to 10 people per interview. In total, we incorporated 26 answers to questionnaires and data from 4 group interviews.
Descriptive analysis. For descriptive analysis, we considered distributions using the median along with the range, minimum−maximum values, and variance. We also conducted a univariate analysis of individual issues and a bivariate analysis for question pairs. We evaluated answer distribution to determine if answers were normal, uniform, bimodal, or similar and applied cross tabulation to analyze the association between two categorytype questions. The survey had several open-ended questions, which we have treated by listing and categorizing the responses. Finally, we counted occurrences of each theme and summarized the responses.
Risk report analysis. Because the targets assessed by the project teams were too diverse to compare findings, we studied the metadata in evaluating report content. For example, we looked at each report to determine if it documented a particular task, such as a threat assessment, and any associated subtasks. We then used CURF to identify method content, combined that method's content into a task group for comparison with other methods, and scored each identified group's completeness with 0, 1, or 2. Because we had 4 reports for each method, we qualitatively assessed each report and added the total score (maximum of 8) for each method. We also assigned score ranges to results from theoretical assessments and risk reports in the literature so that these results were comparable with CURF scores: 0 to 2 equated with not addressed, 3 to 5 with partially addressed, and 6 to 8 with fully addressed.
Method advantages and disadvantages
Project teams ranked satisfaction with the method equally, with all teams giving it a score of 4 (high). Method usefulness ranking varied among individuals, however, with NSMROS receiving the single lowest score of 2 (low) and ISO27005 receiving the highest score of 5 (very high). Table 2 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of using each method and gives the primary supplemental material available to support assessment. OCTAVE A. Teams reported advantages such as being easy to follow with a systematic and comprehensive process. The method's checklist approach helped ensure a rigorous assessment, which also forced the teams to research areas they might have otherwise overlooked. The focus on organizational drivers pointed them toward exploring the organization, which resulted in a better understanding of organizational needs. Consequence estimation was also one of OCTAVE A's strengths, as was ease of application once the method was learned. Overall, the teams reported that the worksheets and templates were effective in supporting their risk assessments.
On the downside, teams unanimously viewed OCTAVE A as hard to understand and learn because it was technically overwhelming and not in their native language. The teams also found the organizational drivers hard to define and were not sure that the time spent working on the drivers was worth the effort. They further reported that the method was too rigid and overly dependent on worksheets, which caused some teams to get stuck on tasks, not progressing beyond the time to produce worksheets for that task. OCTAVE A requires one schema per critical asset and one task to be completed before starting the next, which hindered team efficiency because there was little opportunity to conduct tasks in parallel. For some, the lack of focus on probabilities made it hard to differentiate, prioritize, and communicate risk with equal consequences (risk score) but likely different rates of occurrence. All teams reported that the project's 8 to 10 members were too many to apply OCTAVE A efficiently.
This risk-score problem arose because the groups tended to equate risks and consequences; that is, a risk was essentially the same as its consequence. However, in OCTAVE two risks can have the same consequence, so the two risks need to be treated equally. However, when considering rate of occurrence, the two have vastly different probabilities. By considering only consequences, the decision maker using the OCTAVE A approach can juxtapose risks that are not really equal.
ISO27005.
The teams that used ISO27005 appreciated its detailed approaches, comprehensive tasks, and process descriptions and viewed the method overall as a useful ISRA tool. Among the outstanding advantages were clearly described task inputs and outputs, clear structure, and effectiveness as a lookup reference. The teams also found many useful application examples and checklist templates that helped them decide assessment parameters. They found the method easy to apply and deemed it a solid introduction to ISRA.
However, the teams also found ISO27005 challenging to read and hard to grasp for novices, primarily because of its extensive use of technical expressions, interpretations, and technical terminology. The method's comprehensiveness made it hard to find and learn relevant information. These issues became prominent when the team had to work together to understand the tasks and to determine a project starting point and scope. Like the OCTAVE A teams, the teams working with ISO27005 struggled with technical explanations that were not in their native language.
NSMROS.
The teams found NSMROS easy to understand and apply, reporting that the process was well-defined, sequential, and easy to follow. Unlike OCTAVE A users, NSMROS users did not see the sequential process as a They also like having a method written in their native language, which made it easy to understand. The main disadvantages were the scarcity of how-to descriptions and examples for each step and the insufficient explanation of key tasks. Some individuals reported that the lack of examples in the supporting materials and appendices made the process hard to follow.
Reliance on supplemental material
The main document for all three methods describes the primary process, and the document's appendices elaborate on each process step. Because the appendices are essential to method application, particularly for novices like our project teams, we evaluated the appendices' usefulness for ISRA before investigating what supplementary material the teams required to complete the project, how they used it, and the extent of their dependence on it.
Appendices. OCTAVE A has four appendices. Appendices B and D contain method and sample worksheets that cover assets, risk criteria, impact areas, and risk estimation, which the teams ranked as highly useful. The method guidance in Appendix A received only a medium usefulness ranking, and no teams used Appendix C, which contained a questionnaire worksheet for mapping information assets and corresponding threat scenarios.
ISO27005 has five major annexes. Annex A is intended to assist the practitioner in scoping the assessment. Annex B covers asset identification and evaluation, Annex C elaborates on threat identification, Annex D addresses vulnerability identification and assessment, and Annex E provides ISRA strategies and tools. Although the median rating by ISO27005 teams was only medium usefulness, eight or more team members rated the usefulness of Annexes B and C as high or very high.
The appendices in NSMROS are primarily worksheets addressing ISRA planning, asset and system identification, and risk identification. The NSM-ROS teams ranked the usefulness of these as low overall.
Degree of dependence. In general, teams did not use supporting literature that often. The OCTAVE A teams used the supplements mainly to calculate probability and consequences and to derive organizational drivers. The ISO27005 team sometimes used the foreign and domestic threat assessments along with native-language resources. The NSMROS teams tended to use ISO27001 along with ISO27002. Overall, the level of supplemental material need was consistent for all teams except that the NSMROS team used ISO27001 more frequently. The OCTAVE A and ISO27005 teams also used native-language ISRA resources, which the NSMROS team did not need as much because the method was already in their native language. The last column in Table 2 summarizes what assessment aspects the team thought the supplemental material helped them to complete.
COMPARING METHOD RESULTS
We first compared CURF and the ISRA reports and then evaluated how they differed in including tasks and addressing them.
Risk assessment reports
To assess the qualitative differences in ISRA reports, we applied CURF and identified 26 documented tasks in the reports. Table 3 outlines the tasks and the overall qualitative differences in the content of the delivered reports; the completeness score reveals a clear difference between the methods. As the table shows, the ISO27005 teams had the most complete reports.
The idea behind Table 3 is to outline every task documented in all the reports (bottom up) and compare these with original CURF findings. Thus, the placement of some tasks differs from that in Table 1 . Vulnerability assessment is an example. The three methods vary in suggesting where to conduct this task. Some recommend doing it along with risk identification; others prefer combining making it part of estimating probability and consequences, which occurs during risk estimation. CURF allows for these differences.
Comparison with CURF scores. Table  4 shows the results of comparing each method's theoretical CURF scores with the results in the teams' ISRA reports. We constructed the table from the report contents plus tasks we identified from applying CURF to the method's content (see Table 1 ) for a total of 78 task comparisons. Our aim was to determine how well CURF tasks matched tasks in the actual report, which would indicate how well CURF could predict tasks for a particular method in an actual application. For a positive prediction, both CURF and the reports had to include an addressed or partially addressed task or both had to not mention the task. For a negative prediction, the task had to be addressed in CURF but not in the report or vice versa (all scores with one zero). Using these criteria, CURF positively predicted 65 of the 78 tasks documented, including 9 double absences. Of the negative predictions, 12 involved tasks that were in the report but not in CURF.
We also found that the reports omitted some technical tasks that CURF included (see Table 1 ). For example, no report had documented a preliminary assessment or recorded work on business process identification, risk quantification, or risk aggregation. The last three tasks are alternative and advanced approaches-not mandatory for completing the assigned project and not familiar to ISRA novices. Other than these four tasks, the reports did not omit any tasks that CURF scored as fully addressed.
Interpreting results. The results in Tables 3 and 4 are evidence that the ISRA method greatly influences whether or not a task will be included in the assessment. Notably, OCTAVE A does not include a vulnerability assessment scheme, so the four reports were produced without it, and NSM-ROS has no threat and control assessment, which reports also omitted. However, the results in the tables also show the reverse: tasks included in the report that were not in the method. For example, the cost−benefit analysis was not in OCTAVE A but was adequately addressed in the reports. Likewise, NSMROS has no stakeholder identification but the team deemed that task necessary to complete their risk assessment, likely because all teams depended on interviews for data collection, which required knowing what stakeholders to question.
Another example is organizational understanding, which NSMROS does not address but which was evident in the reports. All NSMROS teams had worked with risk criteria and to some degree with methods for understanding organizational business objectives.
Another issue that affected results was task order. NSMROS, for example, recommends conducting the control efficiency assessment only after completing risk evaluation. Consequently, no NSMROS team did that assessment.
User experience
In employing the methods, all the teams preferred templates and examples. The OCTAVE A teams ranked worksheets as most helpful, although they also viewed the paperwork and extra overhead from worksheets as a negative. Other teams actively sought templates and examples in other sources. The NSMROS teams looked for templates and examples on how to conduct ISRA, as well as information on how to scope the assessment.
Both the ISO27005 and OCTAVE A teams sought out sources in Norwegian to compensate for their difficulty in using a method not in their native language.
Usability. ISO27005 came out best in CURF and was clearly stronger in practice for threat, vulnerability, and control assessments. All the delivered ISO27005 reports were consistently better at describing these areas, and the teams were satisfied with the areas' descriptions.
Some issues encountered by all the teams are well known, such as difficulties with probability and consequence estimations, organizational alignment, and asset evaluation. 6, 11 Our results show that these tasks are still difficult even when described well in the methodology. In particular, the lack of probability calculations in OCTAVE A created problems for all the teams because they were unable to prioritize risks with the same consequence.
Teams also struggled with defining organizational drivers and separating them from organizational vision, mission, goals, and key performance indicators. Although the need to understand the organization is highlighted in both OCTAVE A and ISO27005 (the former even includes the identification of organizational drivers as a task), the teams' difficulty in meeting that requirement indicates that these guidelines are not detailed enough for novices.
Interpreting results. The teams cared mainly about the method's userfriendliness in terms of templates, understandable language, and how-to descriptions. Although Table 3 shows differences in applying each method, we also found issues that occurred with all ISRA methods, particularly knowing what data to collect, how to analyze interviews, and how to interpret the response ratings on questionnaires. All the teams also had challenges in managing stakeholders, such as scheduling interviews, knowing whom to interview, employing communication strategies, and discovering credible sources beyond the interviews. O ur study shows that the choice of ISRA method matters, and underlines the relationship between method and report completeness. When inexperienced risk assessors apply a method, its content will greatly influence both the ISRA process and its outcome. Although our study teams reported issues that were related more to user-friendliness than to the method's process or tasks, some assessment difficulties they encountered are universal and require preparation, such as data collection and analysis and stakeholder management. Our results are motivation for the development of more usable methods and tools for organizational understanding, ISRA application, and additional comparative studies.
Our study had several limitations that future efforts can address. For example, we had different case studies for each group, which limited our ability to isolate which method variable affected what ISRA results. Another limitation is that we gathered data from novices, and the results might not apply for ISRA experts. However, on-site personnel and nonspecialists often conduct ISRA-for them, a usable method is essential, and our results apply. The project teams had members with diverse interests and abilities, which can affect results, and they needed guidance to complete their assignments, which could have led to biases from those providing it. The sample size is another limitation, which is a common issue in resourceintensive qualitative studies. Although our results were strongly indicative, four reports per method might not be sufficient for a conclusion.
Despite these limitations, our study is an important step toward improving ISRA, particularly the quality and type of data collected. Additional work is need to identify data-collection methods and techniques that will make ISRA more efficient-for example, tools for active penetration testing. CURF has promise as a way to raise ISRA quality, and we plan to refine and expand it. Because it is adaptable, CURF can be used in other comparisons simply by adding more nodes, such as issues revealed in practical experience. We hope that others will conduct similar comparative studies to determine what does and does not work-insights that will greatly benefit ISRA researchers and practitioners. 
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